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Abstract 
As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, a key role of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) is to solve disputes among states. Referred to as the ‘World Court’, state parties 
often approach the ICJ in order to seek a final settlement of their disputes. The Court acts as a 
tool to bring the international community closer to the rule of law without being governed or 
controlled by the various structures of the community and in order to achieve the same, it works 
towards having an impartial judicial policy in order to maintain the Court’s independence and 
to showcase its commitment towards the law and principles of the United Nations. However, 
over the years, questions have been raised regarding the overall effectiveness of the ICJ in terms 
of reaching a final settlement of disputes. The non-compliance of the Court’s decision by the 
parties is a very big issue in this regard. Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the 
institutional structure of the ICJ is complex and the Court has to function within its limitations. 
The paper aims to analyze the issues related to the Court’s jurisdiction as well as conformity of 
its decisions by the litigants in order to answer the question as to whether or not the ICJ has 
been able to substantially contribute to dispute resolution. 
Introduction 
‘The International Court of Justice is a body of high achievement and unused potential. But it is 
not a body of uniformly high achievement or unlimited potential.’1 
The above statement by Judge Stephen M Schwebel, undoubtedly, sums up the journey of the 
main judicial organ of the United Nations from its inception. Often referred to as the ‘World 
Court’, the International Court of Justice, hereinafter referred as the ICJ or the Court, was 
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established in 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations. The primary role of the Court is to 
solve disputes among states and to give advisory opinion on legal issues as and when asked for 
by a specified United Nations body or agency.2 As the name ‘World Court’ suggests, the ICJ, as 
an institution is universal in its composition and is intended to serve the entire international 
community without any bias towards a particular legal or social viewpoint. Furthermore, the 
Court, being an international body, whose role is to uphold the legal values of the system by 
adjudicating disputes between states, is independent of the parties to the dispute.3 The Court acts 
as a tool to bring the international community closer to the rule of law without being governed or 
controlled by the various structures of the community and in order to achieve the same, it works 
towards having an impartial judicial policy in order to maintain the Court’s independence and to 
showcase its commitment towards the law and principles of the United Nations.4 The ICJ has 
contributed significantly in the development of international law, thereby, continuing the legacy 
of its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice. As international law is ever 
evolving, the Court through its judicial activity has exercised great influence in development of 
the law, in other words, through its qualitative decisions the ICJ has tried to fill gaps in a system 
of law which is highly unclear to states.5 For example, in Nicaragua v United States of America,6 
the ICJ held that United States actions against Nicaragua violated the prohibition on the use of 
force and the principle of non-intervention. The decision in this case is of immense relevance 
because the Court reflected upon certain important issues regarding the use of force, like, the 
right of self-defense, the law relating to non-intervention and the maintenance of international 
peace and security.7 But, not all cases reach the ICJ, which forces one to think, whether or not 
the ICJ is truly a ‘World Court’. States are often reluctant to approach courts if the dispute can be 
avoided in the first place or decided amicably. A state that is party to a dispute would first try to 
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consider a number of options available to it and seek out the one which is most beneficial.8 
‘There are a number of options available to states for the peaceful resolution of disputes like 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements. There is also no inherent hierarchy with respect to the 
methods specified for any given situation.’9 It is up to states to choose which mechanism they 
want to adopt to address their problems. However, it is also a fact that, disputes do end up in 
courts because parties often wish to have a final settlement to their problems. It is advantageous 
for parties to get a final decision on a matter by a court than not having one through a long non-
judicial process.10  
Although the number of cases that go up to the ICJ is less when compared to those decided at the 
domestic level, still, states, do show an interest in the settlement of their disputes by approaching 
the ICJ. It is desirable for parties to a dispute to get it resolved as it would be beneficial for them 
to address any future disputes.11 More importantly, a decision from a forum like the ICJ will not 
only clarify the law in the concerned area but also help in resolving disputes of similar nature. 
When the Court reflects upon certain rules or legal principles in an area of law, the same can also 
be used as a guideline in the framing of treaties between states so that future disputes can be 
avoided.12 Inspite of the decisions of the ICJ only binding upon the parties to a dispute in a 
particular case, the Court’s decisions also have an impact on states facing similar issues. For 
example, when the Court refers to legal rules in order to answer questions of law, the same can 
also act as a means to further develop the standard in the concerned area of law.13 Another 
important aspect associated with dispute settlement through the judicial process is the quick 
disposal of legal matters. It is in the interest of the parties that a dispute should be disposed off as 
soon as possible without unreasonable delay. The ICJ has often tried to address the problem of 
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delays by repeatedly stressing that the quick disposal of legal matters is in the interest of both the 
Court as well as the litigants.14  
In this background, an attempt is made in this paper to focus primarily on some of the challenges 
the International Court of Justice faces in trying to solve disputes between states. The paper aims 
to analyze the issues related to the Court’s jurisdiction as well as conformity of its decisions by 
the litigants in order to answer the question as to whether or not the ICJ has been able to 
substantially contribute to dispute resolution. 
I. Jurisdiction Under Article 36, Statute of the International Court of Justice 
The notion of jurisdiction as enunciated under article 36, paragraph 1 of the ICJ Statue15 
demonstrates the Court’s authority to adjudicate matters between states. The Court’s jurisdiction 
however, only extends to disputes between the parties. The Court’s long held position on what 
constitutes a ‘dispute’ is as follows: ‘A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a 
conflict of legal views or interests between two persons.’16 Although, there existed a debate in 
the early years of the Court as to whether the term ‘dispute’ constituted legal, political or both 
within its ambit, the same however, has been put to rest in the later years. It is very clear that the 
Court will not adjudicate upon a matter that has no legal element involve in it.17 Moreover, the 
rules under international law being narrow in their application, hardly allow the possibility of a 
matter to come up before the Court that is devoid of any legal issue.18 It is also true that cases 
that go up to the ICJ often have a political agenda behind them, still, the ICJ has always 
maintained a strong position on this issue by stating that, the Statute of the ICJ does not prohibit 
the Court in any manner, not to take cognizance of a dispute because one aspect of it is legal and 
others are not.19 Apart from the jurisdiction in contentious proceedings, the Court also has the 
power to give advisory opinions pursuant to article 96 of Charter of the United Nations.20 But, 
the most important aspect in relation to the jurisdiction of ICJ is that, the same is based on the 
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consent of the parties. Under the Statute, no state can be forced to present a dispute with another 
state for adjudication if there is lack of consent of parties.21 Set up to facilitate peaceful 
settlement of disputes, the ICJ is based upon the premise of consent. As the likelihood of states, 
voluntarily consenting to the Court’s authority is very less and the same may even affect the 
compliance of the Court’s decision, freedom is given to states to either accept or reject the 
settlement of their disputes through the ICJ.22 In order to give its consent to the jurisdiction of the 
Court, a state should be a party to the ICJ Statute but this in itself does not amount to a state 
submitting to the authority of the Court.23  
Consent is required in precise form. As per article 36, paragraph 1, a dispute can be referred to 
the Court through a special agreement between the parties or through a compromissory clause in 
a treaty or agreement and under article 36, paragraph 2, states are free to make a unilateral 
declaration which identifies the jurisdiction of the Court as binding upon them.24 Under the 
Optional Clause system (article 36, paragraph 2) a group of states is formed, each one having 
consented to the Court’s jurisdiction to settle any dispute that may arise between them in 
future. Nonetheless, unilateral declarations under article 36 may contain reservations which limit 
the duration or even exclude certain types of dispute from the Court’s jurisdiction.25 Hence, the 
jurisdiction of the Court under article 36, paragraph 2 is not ‘compulsory’ in the real sense, as 
states have the choice to either accept or reject it and they can do so under such terms and 
conditions as they deem fit. The unilateral declaration of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court is completely discretionary and in making such declaration a state has the option of 
either placing conditions or accepting the Court’s authority unconditionally.26 Not all states have 
made such unilateral declarations. A total of 71 states have given their declaration of acceptance 
of the compulsory jurisdiction.27 However, only one of the permanent members of the Security 
Council, the United Kingdom has consented to the Court’s jurisdiction under article 36 
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paragraph 2. But, it also reserves the right at any time, by means of a notification to add, amend 
or withdraw any of the reservations.28 At the time of introduction of the Optional Clause system, 
the expectation was that, a substantial number of states could be persuaded to make unilateral 
declarations and the same would soon lead to a general acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court’s authority.29 But, the same has not happened, as states over the years have shown 
greater tendency only to subscribe to the Optional Clause in order to structure their own 
declarations which gives them the choice to either accept or reject jurisdiction. The states have 
made the use of both the time limit clauses in order to terminate the declarations merely by a 
notice, and reservations through which states preserve the right to exclude themselves from the 
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.30  
The voluntary modification of declarations on part of states has led to instability in the settlement 
of disputes, especially through the ICJ mechanism. Also, the option of exercising free choice vis 
a vis the Court’s jurisdiction defends states from any judicial scrutiny even when the disputes are 
of a serious nature.31 But, the constraints on the Statute only reflect the concerns at the time of 
framing of the provisions. States being sovereign entities could not have been forced to accept 
the Court’s jurisdiction.32 It is to be noted that, there are inherent limitations on the exercise of 
the judicial function which the Court can hardly ignore. The restraint on the Court’s function is 
the result of its consent based jurisdiction, which makes it difficult for the Court to exercise its 
jurisdiction on states that have not consented to its authority.33 Also, drawbacks to the Optional 
Clause system do require immediate attention, but, considering the complexities of how 
international relations function and the flexibility of international law, there may not be much 
scope for improvement at once.34 As per Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘there is a fundamental 
contradiction between any profession of attachment to the rule of law among nations and the 
denial of jurisdiction of the highest international judicial organ to adjudicate upon disputes 
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involving legal rights and obligations.’35 The Court, however, has always placed the consent of 
parties on a higher pedestal and this factor has shaped its judicial thinking all throughout.36 
As noted above, the judgments of the ICJ are binding upon the parties, but the decisions of the 
Court are hardly complied with, thereby, making the entire exercise almost futile. Therefore, the 
following section will highlight the issues regarding compliance with the judgments of the Court.  
II. Compliance with the International Court of Justice Decisions 
According to article 94, paragraph 1 of Charter of the United Nations, each member of the UN 
take on themselves the duty to abide by the decisions of the International Court of Justice. Note 
that, the rules regarding enforcement of decisions find a place in the Charter and not in the 
Statute of the Court.37 As per article 94, paragraph 2, Charter of the United Nations, the duty to 
monitor the compliance of the decisions is not on the Court but it is for the Security Council to 
make recommendations or take necessary measures to ensure compliance.38 This clearly shows a 
link between the ICJ and the Security Council as organizations, but with different capabilities in 
terms of solving disputes. The ICJ, on one hand, has the task of settling legal claims among 
parties and the Security Council, is assigned the task to give effect to decisions handed down by 
the Court in case a state refuses to abide by the same.39 Before cases of non-compliance are 
examined, it is necessary to understand, what is meant by ‘compliance’. Compliance with the 
final judgment of the Court can be understood as the recognition of the decision as final with the 
performance of any binding obligation in good faith. Compliance also means a duty to give full 
effect to the judgment without the intention of avoiding it or implementing it only partially.40 
Since, states have been given the choice to freely determine whether or not to subject themselves 
to the Court’s jurisdiction, in similar manner, it is up to the states to determine as to how they 
will give effect to an obligation arising from a judgment. How a particular state goes about 
fulfilling its obligation under the judgment in order to finally put to rest a dispute may often not 
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be accepted by the other state.41 Thus, a new dispute may arise vis a vis the issue of compliance 
which states, generally, try to resolve through negotiations. However, in many cases, the same 
rarely works as states often cite the reason that, it is difficult for them to adhere to a strict time 
limit when it comes to complying with judicial decisions obtained at an international forum at 
the domestic level.42  
The cases of United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran), and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America), will be examined in the following sections as they are one of the most 
controversial cases that the Court decided and which raised questions regarding the effectiveness 
of the Court in terms of dispute settlement. 
A. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) 
An application seeking a request for interim measures of protection against Iran was filed by the 
United States of America to the International Court of Justice on 29 November, 1979. The 
application narrated the events of the United States Embassy hostage situation in Tehran and 
highlighted the failure of the Iranian government to solve the situation.43 As per United States, a 
close to seventy people were held hostage and the Government of Iran was providing assistance 
to the group responsible for the hostage situation. United States also alleged that, Iran was in 
direct violation of its obligations under international agreements as well as under customary 
international law to ensure the safety of diplomatic and consular officials and premises.44 United 
States asked the Court to adjudicate and pronounce that i) Iran had been in violation of its legal 
obligations, ii) Iran should ensure that the hostages are released and are allowed to leave Iran 
safely, and iii) Iran should pay reparations to United States and also put on trial those responsible 
for the hostage crisis.45 Iran neither chose to appear before the Court to argue its case nor did it 
submit any written arguments. The position of the Iranian government was, however, 
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communicated to the Court by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran through two letters. In the 
letters, the Minister referred to mostly political reasons rather than legal to persuade the Court 
not to admit the case.46 The Minister mentioned that, ‘the question of the hostage situation 
presented by the United States to the Court only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of 
an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, inter alia, 
more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, 
the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian 
people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.’47 The Court on 
December 15, 1979, passed an interim order in favour of United States granting provisional 
measures. In relation to Iran not being present at the hearing, the Court stated that, the non-
appearance of Iran in the case does not prejudice the passing of provisional measures.48  
 
Moreover, the Court relied upon the Minister’s letter to reach a conclusion that, the hostage crisis 
cannot be regarded as marginal and secondary by Iran because it involves rights of persons who 
were held as hostages. The Court also rejected Iran’s argument of the issue being within its 
sovereignty by stating that a dispute which involves diplomatic and consular relations is well 
within international jurisdiction.49 Irrespective of the Court’s interim order and its final judgment 
on May 24, 1980 Iran refused to release the hostages. It was only eight months after the final 
judgment that Iran released the hostages. The reason for the release of the hostages was 
attributed to a change in Iran’s position as it realized that it was not in its political interest to hold 
the hostages any longer. But, as per United States official statements, the release of hostages was 
in compliance of the Court’s verdict.50  
However, in judging the Court’s effectiveness in settling the dispute, the following needs to be 
borne in mind; Iran was under an obligation to comply with the decision as per article 94, 
paragraph 1 of the Charter but it did not do so.51 Moreover, a Security Council action under 
article 94, paragraph 2 of the Charter could have been utilized to ensure compliance by Iran but, 
the United States did not ask the Council to take necessary steps because a proposal to the 
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Security Council to impose an economic boycott on Iran had already been vetoed by the Soviet 
Union in January 1980.52 Considering that Iran never showed any interest in the Court’s hearing 
and it ultimately did not honour the Court’s decision, a question arises, that, whether the entire 
hostage crisis was fit to be solved through the judicial mechanism in the first place and whether 
the Court was right in deciding such an issue because the reputation of the Court gets directly 
affected when its decisions are not respected by the parties.53  
 
B. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America) 
An application was filed by Nicaragua seeking a request for interim measures before the ICJ 
against the United States of America on 9 April, 1984. The application sought a declaration that 
the United States was in violation of its duties under international law, including the prohibition 
on the use of force, intervention and the freedom on the high seas.54 The United States contested 
the Court’s jurisdiction because it saw a little chance of overcoming the odds in the Court as its 
policy of overthrowing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua as well as its support for the counter-
revolutionary group, Contras was known to everyone.55 United States had given covert support 
in the form of financial assistance, training, and military equipment to the revolutionary group. 
Furthermore, it was also alleged by Nicaragua that United States had mined its harbours and 
launched armed raids on its ports and oil depots.56 The ICJ’s stand on the issue of jurisdiction in 
this case became highly controversial and it later led to United States withdrawing itself from the 
Court’s proceedings.57  
Nicaragua had based its application on both countries declarations accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court. But, according to the United States, Nicaragua’s declaration of 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice had never 
been ratified. Nicaragua contested this argument by stating that its declaration had conferred 
jurisdiction on the Court under article 36, paragraph 5 of the Statute.58 The United States also 
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relied upon its declaration under article 36, paragraph 2, which it had modified few days prior to 
the submission of the application by Nicaragua. United States had filed a document with the UN 
Secretary General, according to which, the United States was to be excluded from the 
applicability of the compulsory jurisdiction in relation to ‘disputes with any Central American 
State or arising out of or related to events in Central America, a proviso that was to take effect 
immediately and to remain in force for two years, so as to foster the continuing regional dispute 
settlement process which seeks a negotiated solution to the interrelated political, economic and 
security problems of Central America.’59 United States also contested the application on the 
point that, the ICJ had no competence to deal with matters that concerned armed conflict and the 
right to self-defense as these fell within the purview of the Security Council, also, Nicaragua had 
failed to exhaust the regional diplomatic process to peacefully solve the dispute, hence it could 
not bring a claim to the Court.60  
The decision regarding jurisdiction and admissibility was delivered by the Court on 26 
November, 1984. The Court rejected the arguments made by the United States, stating that it had 
jurisdiction to decide under article 36, paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Statute.61 Although the Court 
tried to explain the issues raised by the two nations in its decision, yet, the decision was highly 
controversial mainly because of the opinion of the dissenting judges in relation to the issue of 
jurisdiction. United States refused to accept the decision and decided not to participate in further 
proceedings of the Court on the ground that, the decision was bad in law and appeared to be 
biased.62 The ICJ in its decision on 27 June, 1986 held that, United States did engage in the 
mining of Nicaraguan ports and depots thereby interrupting its freedom to use the high seas. 
United States also violated the law on interventions and the prohibition on the use of force. 
According to the Court, United States was therefore, under a duty to refrain from actions that 
violated international obligations and was liable to make reparations to Nicaragua.63 Considering 
that United States chose not to take part in the proceedings of the Court and it decided not to 
honour the decision despite the pressure from the international community, one may view the 
non-compliance as a failure on the part of the ICJ in settlement of the dispute. Should the Court 
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have denied jurisdiction taking into consideration the fact that compliance may become an issue 
after the decision as United States policy towards Nicaragua was out in the open, is a question 
which is debated to this day.64  
The following section attempts to relook at the issue of compliance through recent ICJ decisions. 
C. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 
A treaty was entered into between Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1977, to construct a system of 
locks on the Danube River in order to prevent flooding. The treaty neither had a termination 
clause nor did it provide for a right to suspend or abandon the work unilaterally by a party.65 
While the work on the Czechoslovakia’s portion was almost close to completion, Hungary first 
suspended work and then chose to leave the project, citing ecological concerns. Hungary later 
notified Czechoslovakia about it terminating the treaty. The dispute was brought before the ICJ 
by Hungary and Slovakia by a special agreement in 1993.66 The Court was asked to decide 
whether or not Hungary was entitled to first suspend and then abandon the project on its own and 
what was the legal validity of Hungary’s notification of termination of the treaty.67  
ICJ gave its decision on 25 September, 1997 wherein it held that, under the 1977 treaty, Hungary 
was not entitled to unilaterally suspend and abandon the project in 1989. Also, Hungary’s 
notification of terminating the treaty did not have any legal effect. The Court reached a 
conclusion that the parties themselves need to decide on how to go ahead with the working of the 
treaty keeping in mind various aspects like, protection of the environment etc.68 In order to 
comply with the Court’s decision, both the parties started negotiations. But, after the breakdown 
of negotiations, Slovakia again requested the ICJ for an additional judgment citing the reason 
that, Hungary was reluctant in enforcing the decision. However, no proceedings were brought 
after there was a change of government in Slovakia in 1998.69 Inspite of repeated talks between 
the parties, both states were not able to agree on the usefulness of the project. Now, regarding the 
role of the ICJ in the resolution of the dispute, it can be argued that, by not deciding the issue 
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between the parties and asking them to negotiate the matter themselves, the Court pushed aside 
the task given to it by the parties.70 On the other hand, it can also be said that, by not deciding 
upon the matter, the Court provided an opportunity to the parties to stabilize the matter 
themselves because the issue was more of a political nature than legal.71  
D. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v  United States of 
America) 
‘On 9 January, 2003 Mexico brought proceedings against the United States of America for 
alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963. In its Application, 
Mexico based the jurisdiction of the Court on article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute and on article 
1 of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which 
accompanies the Vienna Convention.’72 The case concerned the United States application of 
article 36, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations regarding the 54 Mexican prisoners who 
were sentenced to death in different jurisdictions within the United States. Mexico also obtained 
provisional measures from the ICJ which prohibited the United States from executing any of the 
prisoners before the final judgment form the Court. United States did not execute any prisoner 
before the decision came out.73  
The ICJ in its 2004 decision held that the Mexican prisoners located in different jurisdictions of 
the United States were entitled to consular communication. The decision confirmed that the 
Vienna Convention laid down justiciable rights and the United States had violated those rights.74 
‘The ICJ directed the United States to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and 
reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals on death row.’75 After 
the Avena decision, President George W. Bush sent a memorandum to the Attorney General, 
stating that the United States being a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relation 
(VCCR) and its Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, will 
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abide by the verdict given by the Court in the Avena case.76 But, the United States Supreme 
Court in Medellin v Texas,77 refused to follow the Avena decision and the President’s 
memorandum, inspite of coming to a conclusion that United States had an international 
obligation to follow the ICJ’s verdict. The Supreme Court held that, it is Congress and not the 
President that has the power to enact a legislation to give effect to the Avena decision in 
situations wherein national laws prevents the United States in fulfilling an international 
obligation.78 The position in the Medellin case was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in its 
2011 decision in Leal Garcia v Texas, wherein a request to stay the execution of a convicted 
prisoner on the ground that his conviction was in violation of VCCR was rejected by the 
Supreme Court.79 
Conclusion 
From the above discussed cases, it is apparent that the relationship between the ICJ and States is 
not at all equivalent to the relationship between courts and litigants in a domestic setup (for 
example, Avena case). The fact that, ICJ is part of a wide range of mechanisms available to 
states to solve their dispute needs to be borne in mind when critiquing its effectiveness in terms 
of dispute resolution. As is the case with any organization, ICJ too has its limitations and it has to 
function within those boundaries. In judging the Court’s role in the peaceful resolution of 
disputes, how a relevant law is applied by the ICJ to a particular dispute is rarely an issue, 
although questions have been raised on this in the past (Nicaragua) but, how effective is the 
remedy provided by the ICJ so that there are no problems in terms of compliance, has always 
been a concern. The international community expects a broader approach to their problems from 
the ICJ rather than a narrower one. States go to the ICJ in order to have a final settlement to their 
disputes and it would serve them no purpose if after going through a long judicial process, they 
do not have a final remedy. However, as per the ICJ Statute, the Court’s role is only limited to 
giving decisions and it is left to the states to comply with the Court’s verdict (bear in mind the 
ineffectiveness of article 94 of the Charter). A major problem that the Court has been facing both 
in the pre and post Nicaragua era in relation to compliance is, states contesting the Court’s 
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jurisdiction to decide the matter. Although, the parties to a dispute have the right to do so, but, 
the focus has been more on ‘questioning’ the very subject matter of the dispute than the 
application of substantive law.  
It is often said that, the ICJ should abstain itself from deciding upon certain controversial issues 
(which are highly political in nature) irrespective of it having jurisdiction over them in order to 
maintain a good compliance record keeping in mind the abuse of the Optional Clause system.80 
But, if the ICJ does this, can it guarantee genuine compliance in future in matters which are not 
strictly legal and can this act of stepping aside from its role by the ICJ, provide an assurance that, 
disputes which are left out by the ICJ because of their political nature would not come before the 
Court later. Inspite of such complexities, the ICJ should not, in an exercise of caution, ignore 
genuine instances in which it can exercise jurisdiction for fear of non compliance as doing so 
would affect the balance between international law and its political subjects. Nonetheless, when 
discussing about the different aspects regarding compliance, it would be unfair to compare the 
enforcement mechanisms of the ICJ to that of domestic courts. The institutional structure of the 
ICJ is complex and the option available under the Charter for implementing its judgments 
remains ineffective. Furthermore, in many cases, states do not even consider the option of going 
to the Security Council in order to seek enforcement of the decisions.  
Under the Charter, the Security Council is assigned the task to take appropriate action to enforce 
the Court’s decision at the request of a party seeking compliance. As a result of the involvement 
of the Security Council in the process of compliance, the issue of enforcement has become more 
political than legal in nature. In the cases discussed above, states have not asked the Security 
Council to use its powers under article 94, even in situations of clear non-compliance. Therefore, 
it is true that the Charter mechanism for enforcement of decisions has failed to play a substantial 
role in practice. But, why states are hesitant in resorting to the Security Council? Enforcement 
under the Charter provisions is only discretionary upon the Security Council. The relationship 
between article 94, paragraph 2 and the Security Council remains unclear to states. Another 
reason why states do not resort to the Security Council is because of the danger of its resolutions 
getting vetoed by any of the permanent five members. The need is to have an independent form 
of action (considering the judicial nature of the matter) which does not overlap with the normal 
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functioning of the Security Council. Enforcement of decisions has to be seen differently from 
other issues of peace and security by the Security Council. Therefore, while judging the role of 
the ICJ in dispute settlement, it can be concluded that, irrespective of all its problems, the 
Court’s efforts in resolving disputes cannot be neglected, especially in the development of 
international law. But, the ICJ as an international forum for dispute settlement will only be able 
to carry out its functions in a better manner, if it is accepted as an institution with all its 
limitations. Although, there is scope for further improving its functioning as the ‘World Court’ 
which also includes strengthening the enforcement mechanism under the Charter, but, at the 
same time, it has to be understood that the ICJ is only a part of the system of dispute resolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
